rom Hospitality to Half-Measures: Albania 1998 vs. Germany 2015
From Hospitality to Half-Measures: A Comparative Reflection on Refugee Reception in Albania (1999) and Germany (2015)
By Evan Trimmis
I. Introduction
In 1998, I first travelled to Albania, at a time when tensions in Kosovo were escalating and war was becoming unavoidable. One year later, in 1999, the world witnessed one of the fastest mass exoduses in European history. Nearly half a million Kosovars fled to Albania in a matter of weeks.
What happened next was extraordinary.
Albanian families—despite economic hardship and political instability—opened their homes, emptied their beds, and fed entire families of strangers. There were no refugee camps in the beginning. There were households transformed into humanitarian shelters.
Seventeen years later, in 2015, Germany faced a different refugee movement. It opened its borders, but not its legal framework. Refugees were welcomed in, but placed into a system where legal identity resolution was postponed—or avoided—for years.
This article compares these two fundamentally different approaches:
➡️ Albania’s complete humanitarian response in 1999,
➡️ Germany’s incomplete administrative response in 2015.
II. Albania 1999: Full Responsibility Without Resources
1. Hospitality as a moral act, not a political performance
Albanian families accepted refugees directly into their homes. No fenced areas, no waiting halls. People were treated as guests, not as administrative cases.
2. Care first, paperwork later
Safety and dignity were the priority. Bureaucratic procedures were secondary. The principle was simple: people first.
3. Society compensated for institutional weakness
Even without state capacity, communities acted with responsibility. When the state lacked resources, the people filled the gap.
This was not the result of wealth or institutional strength—it was rooted in cultural values.
III. Germany 2015: The Politics of an Incomplete Welcome
1. An invitation without a legal plan
Germany opened its doors but dramatically underestimated the legal consequences. Many people entered under unclear, unverified, or false identities—issues that remain unresolved a decade later.
2. Refugees placed in camps, not communities
Unlike the Albanian model, refugees in Germany were isolated from society. Physical entry was granted; social and legal inclusion was not.
3. A long-term strategy was missing
Germany failed to implement:
- a coordinated plan for identity clarification,
- aligned cooperation with origin countries,
- clear timelines for status resolution,
- consistent handling of children born in Germany during this period.
The result has been administrative paralysis.
IV. Ten Years Later: Legal Limbo and Statelessness
Germany still hosts tens of thousands of individuals who remain:
- without verified identity,
- without secure residence status,
- without integration pathways,
- without citizenship prospects.
This long-term limbo erodes trust in institutions and undermines the humanitarian narrative Germany projected in 2015.
V. Why Germany’s Approach Failed
1. Moral ambition without legal architecture
The political gesture was strong, but the administrative follow-through was weak.
2. Avoidance of difficult legal decisions
Rather than resolving identity issues early, Germany postponed them. Files moved; people remained stuck.
3. Bureaucracy substituted strategy
A system built for routine cases struggled with exceptional circumstances.
4. Institutions acted defensively, not creatively
Instead of creating flexible legal mechanisms (special courts, identity-resolution procedures), authorities often said:
“We cannot proceed because the situation is unclear.”
But it was the state itself that allowed the unclear situation to exist.
VI. What Germany Could Have Done
Germany had the institutional capacity to:
- establish special identity clarification courts,
- offer conditional citizenship pathways for long-term stateless children,
- build structured cooperation with origin states,
- transform temporary protection into long-term legal certainty.
These steps were never taken consistently or systematically.
VII. Conclusion
In 1999, Albania—poor, unstable, and unprepared—provided full humanitarian protection to refugees: shelter, dignity, community, responsibility.
In 2015, Germany—wealthy, stable, and administratively advanced—provided only half: entry without resolution, protection without a future, hospitality without legal certainty.
A modern state must do more than open its borders.
It must open its legal system.
Otherwise, the promise remains incomplete.